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Just as investors want the companies they hold equity in to do well, homeowners have a financial interest in the success of their communities. If neighborhood schools are good, if property taxes and crime rates are low, then the value of the homeowner’s principal asset–his home–will rise. Thus, as William Fischel shows, homeowners become watchful citizens of local government, not merely to improve their quality of life, but also to counteract the risk to their largest asset, a risk that cannot be diversified. Meanwhile, their vigilance promotes a municipal governance that provides services more efficiently than do the state or national government.
Just as investors want the companies they hold equity in to do well, homeowners have a financial interest in the success of their communities. If neighborhood schools are good, if property taxes and crime rates are low, then the value of the homeowner’s principal asset–his home–will rise. Thus, as William Fischel shows, homeowners become watchful citizens of local government, not merely to improve their quality of life, but also to counteract the risk to their largest asset, a risk that cannot be diversified. Meanwhile, their vigilance promotes a municipal governance that provides services more efficiently than do the state or national government.
Fischel has coined the portmanteau word “”homevoter”" to crystallize the connection between homeownership and political involvement. The link neatly explains several vexing puzzles, such as why displacement of local taxation by state funds reduces school quality and why local governments are more likely to be efficient providers of environmental amenities. The Homevoter Hypothesis thereby makes a strong case for decentralization of the fiscal and regulatory functions of government.
October 27th, 2010 at 4:28 pm
Fischel sometimes uses elegant terms (“homevoter,” “unlovely land uses”), classical phrases (“people who buy houses are more careful about it than almost any other transaction, save perhaps getting married”), and even employs a reverse golden rule of sorts (“municipalities will foist disamenities on their neighbor that they would not do unto themselves”). Sometimes Fischel uses blunt summarization such as when he writes that the “Smart Growth Movement” and growth controls “seem to act more like a cartel for those already in possession of suburban homes than as a rationalizer of metropolitan development patterns.” Fischel includes helpful subheadings in each chapter, reminiscent of Machiavelli’s classic The Prince, that succinctly tell you what he is driving at. Unlike most economics texts, there are no obfuscating “supply and demand” tables in this book.
My only disappointment with the book is that Fischel did not go far enough. For instance, what just compensation is to be provided to landowners whose property has been downzoned for environmental preservation by local government, then acquired by a state or federal agency, or a non-government organization (NGO), for the same preservation use for which it was downzoned? When local government downzones a property to buy it on the cheap it is typically considered a confiscatory taking. What is the difference when two levels of government act in concert to accomplish the same thing, both in response to the same incumbent home voting constituency? Moreover, such interference with real estate markets often results in a situation where there no longer is available any land sales market data from which to determine the value of a property, except government and non-government organization sales that can not be considered under government real estate appraisal standards (see reviewer’s “Valuing Nature Land in ‘Extinct’ Markets,” Appraisal Journal, 1998). Another example would be toxic waste site cleanup policies that are less concerned with the “health effects” than “wealth effects” to surrounding property values (see reviewer’s “But is it Market Value?” Appraisal Journal, 1999 and “The Externality Principle: Value Transfers from Toxic Waste Site Cleanups as a Basis for Regulatory Takings,” Environmental Claims Journal, 2001). How can “people vote with their feet” when growth controls are meant to put one’s feet in cement so to speak? Perhaps Fischel will follow up with a sequel that can address such dilemmas in greater depth? The Homevoter Hypothesis is an indispensable book for city managers, local politicians, zoning and school boards, and the legal and real estate professions. I give it an unqualified highest rating.
Wayne Lusvardi
The opinions expressed above are solely those of the reviewer.
October 27th, 2010 at 4:57 pm
Fischel does a good job of proving the “people vote with their feet” hypothesis, but more importantly, he ties property values to virtually every local government action (and inaction). Virtually everything that city government does is capitalized into property values — sometimes with negative effects and sometimes with positive effects. Americans are extremely mobile, moving every 4 years, so we really do vote with our feet to a greater extent than most city governments care to accept.